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Plaintiff/Appellant, Appeals No. 940446-CA 
vs. Category No. 15 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, WILLIAM H. 
KING, MARCUS GILBERT, GORDON 
V. HOLBROOK, DONALD S. COLOVICH 
WILLIAM T. HOPKINS, DARIN G. 
WOOLSTENHULME, JENNIFER MacARHTHUR, 
RITA M. KENNEDY and/or U.S. 
FOREST SERVICE, DAVID ADAMSON, 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is a negligence action brought by Plaintiff for injuries 
suffered in a multiple vehicle crash. The four main Defendants to 
this action were dismissed by the trial court on summary judgment. 
Plaintiff was a passenger in the vehicle of Defendant 
MacArthur, which went out of control, spun around, and crashed 
after John Doe 1 swerved into her lane to avoid an obstruction. It 
is believed that Plaintiff then exited, or began to exit Defendant 
MacArthur's car. MacArthur's car was hit driver's headlight to 
driver's headlight by Defendant Woolstenhulme and Defendant 
1 
Woolstenhulme's full size extended cab pickup rotated counter-
clockwise until it hit another car and came to rest sideways in the 
road. MacArthur's car was then hit again head-on by Hopkins who 
saw the hazard, stopped and was hit from behind by Defendant 
Colovich at high speed. 
Hopkins said he was stopped for a minute or more before being 
hit by Colovich, MacArthur said the whole accident sequence was 
"instantaneous". 
The Trial Judge conceded that these four Defendants were 
negligent but granted summary judgment on the issue of proximate 
cause. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff and Appellant does not agree with all facts as 
stated by various Defendants. 
2. All Defendants rely heavily upon depositions which have 
not been published or filed with the trial court.1 
3. The only affidavit or discovery submitted to the Trial 
^he record on appeal consists of four files and no 
depositions or transcripts. While two motions to publish were made 
(see Appendix A) , no ruling was requested with regard to these 
motions or made pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration. Also included in Appendix A are the rulings of the 
trial court showing that no depositions were ever published. No 
deposition transcripts have ever been filed or published in this 
case. 
2 
Judge in connection with these motions was filed by Plaintiff.2 
4. Defendants rely upon no affidavits or filed discovery to 
support these motions or their opposition to this appeal. 
5. Since no depositions have been filed, Plaintiff and 
Appellant does not have access to all depositions for preparing a 
brief, not did the Trial Judge have access to determine uncontested 
facts. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
According to Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
summary judgment is only appropriate: 
Ii the pleadings, depositions, and answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavit, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
in a negligence action, the question of liability is a 
question of fact to be determined by the jury. Silcox v. Skaaas 
Alpha Beta, Inc. . 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct App 1991); Hunt v. Hurst. 
785 P. 2d 414 (Utah 1990). It should be noted that the trial court 
conceded that the Defendants were negligent in this case, but 
decided the case on the issue of proximate cause. 
Likewise, the issue of causation presents a question of fact 
to be determined by the jury. 
The Utah Supreme Court held in Godesky v. provo city. 690 p#2d 
2Appendix B 
3 
541, 544 (Utah 1984) ,f • . .proximate causation is generally a 
matter of fact to be determined by the jury." Watters II, 626 P.2d 
457-58. . The Godesky court further went on to state 
An intervening negligent act does not automatically 
become a superseding cause that relieves the original 
actor of liability. The earlier actor is charged with 
the foreseeable negligent acts of others. Therefore, if 
the intervening negligence is foreseeable, the earlier 
negligent act is a concurring cause. "[T]his includes 
situations where negligent or other wrongful conduct of 
others should reasonable be anticipated." (cites omitted) 
Godesky, at 545. 
[0]ne cannot excuse himself from liability arising from 
his negligent acts merely because the later negligence of 
another concurs to cause an injury, if the latter act was 
a legally foreseeable event. 
Jensen v. Mountain States Tel, and Tel. Co.. 611 P.2d 363, 365-6 
(Utah 1980). 
Whether under the particular circumstances [Defendant] 
should have foreseen that [Defendants] conduct would have 
exposed others to an unreasonable risk of harm; and this 
includes situations where negligent or other wrongful 
conduct of others should reasonably be anticipated." 
Godesky v. Provo City Corp. 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984). Harris v. 
Utah Transit Authority. 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983). 
The first actor cannot excuse himself from liability 
arising from his negligent acts merely because the later 
negligent of another concurs to cause injury, if the 
later act were a foreseeable event. 
Jensen, at 458; Harris, at 220. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS' LEGAL AUTHORITY IS NOT APPLICABLE 
4 
Defendant and Appellee Jennifer MacArthur cites Mitchell v. 
Pierson Ent. . 597 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985) for the proposition 
that a direct causal connection must be established between the 
negligence and the injury. The Court should note that the victim 
in Mitchell was murdered, execution style, while in his hotel room. 
There was no evidence of forced entry, nor evidence of how the 
perpetrator got into the room. The Court granted summary judgment 
in favor of the hotel on the issue of proximate cause. 
In this case, there is no question that Plaintiff was in a 
position of peril as a direct and proximate result of the negligent 
driving of Jennifer MacArthur and John Doe 1, the semi-truck 
driver, and that he was injured in the ensuing collision or chain 
of collisions. 
Defendants MacArthur and John Doe further cite the Court to 
Staheli v. Farmers Cooperative of Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680 (Utah 
1982) for the same proposition. In Staheli, the Plaintiff hired 
Defendant to store barley pursuant to a contract. A fire of 
unknown origin destroyed the warehouse and part of the stored 
grain. Staheli claimed on appeal that they were entitled to a 
presumption that the Defendant was negligent as a matter of law. 
The parties conceded that there was no evidence as to the actual 
cause of the fire. 
In this case, the cause of the crash is clear. Defendant 
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MacArthur was driving too fast for existing conditions, speeding, 
and failed to exercise proper lookout as established by Plaintiff's 
accident reconstructionist Greg DuVal. As a result of that 
negligence, there was a crash in which Plaintiff was injured. 
Defendants attempt to confuse the Court with the facts of the 
accident and the mechanism of injury suffered by Plaintiff. 
However, this case does not turn on the exact mechanism of injury 
to Plaintiff. In fact, Staheli was decided on bailment theories, 
where the Plaintiff claimed a presumption of negligence based upon 
the right or power of control. The Court found that the bailor did 
not have the exclusive right or power of control, as the storage 
area was available at all times to Plaintiff as well as Defendant. 
The question faced by the Appellate Court was the right to control 
the events and conditions of storage, and whether it was 
exclusively or even primarily the duty of the bailee. 
In Staheli the Court also ruled with regard to the negligence 
claims and proximate cause, finding that the Plaintiffs had not 
been able to establish the cause of the fire. In this case, 
Plaintiff can establish the cause of the accident which was the 
negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 
POINT II 
THE ONLY EVIDENCE OF INJURY AND CAUSE WAS PROVIDED BY PLAINTIFF 
Finally, Defendants place great emphasis on the conclusory 
6 
statement that a jury would be required to speculate as to the 
cause of Plaintiff's injuries. Plaintiff specifically alleged 
proximate cause in his complaint and no affidavits were filed in 
opposition to that averment. Defendants never provided a possible 
method of injury other than being impacted in an automobile 
accident. 
Were the Court to consider depositions which were taken but 
not published, a particularly enlightening passage can be found in 
the deposition of Dr. Robert J. Jackson, wherein he was examined by 
Mr. Zaccheo as follows: 
Q. Dr. Jackson, my name is Mike Zaccheo. . 
Judging from what you have been able to see of his right 
knee, is there any way you can give us any idea of what 
kind of forces, either directly or otherwise may have 
produced this type of injury? We know that he was either 
struck by a car or pushed by one or something. But I am 
curious to know whether this is consistent with an impact 
kind of damage or consistent with perhaps being thrust up 
in the air and landing wrong, or whatever else might have 
taken place. 
A. Actually, the most common mechanism for a 
ruptured anterior crucia ligament is a hyper-extension 
rotary or rotary-type injury. So you are hit, and the 
knee hyper extends and the femoral condial goes back and 
ruptures the ligament. That is the most common. There 
are some injuries that occur in flexion with a vigorous 
flexion, flexion load and torque that can also rupture a 
ligament. 
Q. Was there anything else about his condition 
that would help you maybe form an opinion as to whether 
or not this damage occurred as a result of blunt trauma, 
as opposed to, again, being projected into the air and 
landing wrong on the knee? 
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A. Not really. It was an acute injury. I mean, 
he had blood in his joint. And so it occurred — I am 
sure it occurred at the time of the accident. 
The argument that the jury is left to speculate the cause of 
injury is simply untrue. Proof of the exact mechanism has never 
been required to prove an injury. For example, in a fire injury 
case, it is not incumbent upon the Plaintiff to establish whether 
injuries were sustained as a direct result of fire or as a result 
of heat and smoke. In an automobile accident case with injuries to 
the neck and back it is not required that a Plaintiff establish 
whether he was injured as a result of secondary impact or as a 
result of whiplash mechanism. The injury arising from the 
negligence is all that is required to establish proximate cause. 
This is supported by the quote from Farmers Insurance Exchange and 
Jennifer MacArthur's brief at 12, wherein Defendant quotes Joyce v. 
M&M Gas Co., 672 P.2d 1172 (Okla 1983), wherein the Court held: 
.The proximate cause of an injury must be the 
efficient cause which sets in motion the chain of 
circumstances leading to the injury;. . . 
POINT III 
••PROXIMATE CAUSE" INCLUDES CONCURRENT AND FORESEEABLE 
ACTIONS OF OTHERS 
Defendants MacArthur and John Doe continue to attempt to gain 
mileage in their proximate cause argument by claiming that the jury 
may be left to speculate whether Woolstenhulme or Colovich was 
primarily responsible for Plaintiff's injuries. Although 
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Defendants have claimed that Plaintiff was injured when he stepped 
into the roadway, Clark previously testified "if I had gotten out, 
it would have been right there in the safety lane" (Clark, P. 65, 
L. 7-8). This, coupled with a claim that MacArthur's negligence 
was cut off or came to a rest and that Plaintiff was injured by a 
superseding intervening cause is founded upon disputed facts. The 
further innuendo that Plaintiff was contributorily negligent for 
stepping out of the MacArthur automobile raises the question of 
liability which is purely a question for the jury and has already 
been decided in Plaintiff's favor by the trial judge. As the Utah 
Supreme Court stated in Jensen v. Mtn. States Telephone and 
Telegraph Co.. 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980) "One cannot excuse himself 
from liability arising from his negligent acts merely because the 
later negligence of another concurs to cause an injury, if the 
later act was a legally foreseeable event". 
It would seem reasonable to presume that another crash or 
crash sequence may occur. Gilbert initially lost control of his 
automobile and stalled it in the right hand lane. Kennedy saw the 
Gilbert vehicle, attempted an evasive maneuver, lost control of her 
vehicle and stalled it in the left hand lane. Both vehicles had 
come to stop prior to MacArthur arriving at the scene and MacArthur 
lost control of her vehicle and it stalled partially in the left 
hand lane past Gilbert's vehicle but short of Kennedy's vehicle. 
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Kennedy foresaw the danger when she stalled her vehicle and exited 
the car and jumped over the guardrail. Woolstenhulme next arrives 
on the scene, drives past Gilbert'& vehicle, hits Gilbert, hits 
MacArthur head on, and crashes into Kennedy's vehicle. 
Hopkins, who was previously driving next to Woolstenhulme, saw 
the hazard and slowed to a stop short of the accident scene before 
being hit from behind by Colovich traveling at a high rate of speed 
who went on to strike the Woolstenhulme truck. Hopkins hit 
MacArthur head on. After this crash sequence, Gilbert, MacArthur 
Heather Reeves, and Plaintiff Brad Clark were injured. 
Defendant MacArthur and John Doe were negligent, and their 
negligence directly lead to the injury of all the occupants of the 
MacArthur vehicle. MacArthur testified that the entire occurrence 
seemed to happen "instantaneously", and as such her negligence set 
in motion the chain of circumstances leading to the injury. 
POINT IV 
CONFLICTING OPINIONS OF EXPERTS SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY THE JURY 
Prior to bringing this action, Plaintiff retained the services 
of DuVal Investigations and Accident Reconstruction to determine 
the involvement of the various vehicles in this case. The 
preliminary accident investigation is included herewith as Appendix 
C to this brief. (R. 270-273) . Mr. DuVal has filed two affidavits 
in opposition to various motions for summary judgment. (See 
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Appendix B and D) 
Defendant Woolstenhulme says that he should be granted summary 
judgment because Plaintiff does not know how he was injured and 
that Mr. DuVal testified in his deposition that Plaintiff was most 
likely hit by MacArthur's vehicle after it was hit by 
Woolstenhulme's truck or that he was hit by Woolstenhulme's truck, 
(brief of Woolstenhulme at 7-8). 
Woolstenhulme goes on to try and establish inconsistencies of 
the testimony of Mr. DuVal by raising a first affidavit wherein 
DuVal said Plaintiff could have been injured after MacArthur's 
vehicle was struck head on by Hopkins (R. 251); his deposition 
testimony wherein he stated Plaintiff was most likely injured as a 
result of the Woolstenhulme truck hitting the MacArthur vehicle but 
he may have been injured when MacArthur's vehicle was struck head 
on by Hopkins (DuVal depo. P. 58, L. 21 to P. 59, L. 18) and an 
affidavit in opposition to these motions wherein he provided that 
the most probable mechanism of injury was the sequence of crashes 
caused by the Woolstenhulme truck and the second most likely 
probability consists of the crash sequence caused by the Colovich 
automobile (R. 631). Although Woolstenhulme claims an 
inconsistency in this testimony, such is not the case. Hopkins was 
struck by Colovich at high speed, causing the Hopkins' vehicle to 
make head-on contact with the MacArthur vehicle. DuVal believed 
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Plaintiff to have been struck by the MacArthur vehicle and thrown 
over the guardrail. In any event, the question of inconsistent 
findings is a question for the jury. 
Plaintiff also retained the services of David Stephens to 
render opinions regarding human factors aspects of the accident. 
Mr. Stephens reconstructed the accident and came to the conclusion 
that Plaintiff was most likely injured as a result of being struck 
by Hopkins1 Jeep after it was hit by Colovich's Buick. (Brief of 
Woolstenhulme at 9). 
Looking at the evidence which has been presented in this case, 
there is ample evidence to support a verdict against Woolstenhulme 
or Colovich. While Defendants claim there is conflicting testimony 
from different witnesses, "it is the exclusive province of the jury 
to determine the credibility of the witness, weigh the evidence, 
and make findings of fact". Groen v. Tri-O-Inc. , 667 P.2d 598, 601 
(Utah 1983). Likewise, 
[w]here the evidence is conflicting and the jury is 
properly instructed, we do not upset those findings of 
fact on appeal except upon a showing of the evidence, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, so 
clearly preponderating in Appellant's favor that a 
reasonable person could not differ on the outcome of the 
case. 
Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Hodges v. Gibson Products 
Co^, 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991): 
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We accept the evidentiary inferences that tend to support 
the verdict rather than contrary inferences that support 
the Appellant's version of the facts, even if we might 
have judged those inferences differently had we been 
deciding the matter in the first instance, and not as an 
appellate court. When the testimony of the witnesses is 
in conflict, we accept the testimony which supports the 
jury verdict, unless it is inherently impossible, and 
ignore the evidence which does not support the verdict 
even if we think it more convincing. 
Plaintiff contends that Defendants have relied upon smoke 
screen and confusion to skew the real issues in this action. There 
are significant questions of fact which should preclude the entry 
of summary judgment as to any of the Defendants which are party to 
this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff contends that the individual Defendants must be 
looked at individually. Jennifer MacArthur went out of control and 
crashed resulting in injuries to herself, and her passengers 
Heather Reeves and Bradley Clark. The injuries seemed to have 
occurred in an unbroken continuous sequence of events arising from 
the accident. The summary judgment as to Defendants MacArthur and 
John Doe 1 should be reversed and the case remanded to the trial 
court for further proceedings. 
There is an admitted conflict in the evidence regarding the 
potential liability of Defendant Colovich and Defendant 
Woolstenhulme. Plaintiff had two experts, one of whom thought 
Plaintiff was injured primarily by the negligence of Woolstenhulme 
13 
and one who believed the injuries were caused by the negligence of 
Colovich. It is the exclusive province of the jury to determine 
the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence and make 
findings of fact. For these reasons, and others as presented to 
this Court, the Court should set aside the grant of summary 
judgment as to Defendants Woolstenhulme and Colovich and should 
remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings. 
DATED AND SIGNED this ^^ day of November, 1994. 
^> s. 
J$HES G. CLARK 
^Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant 
14 
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foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, postage prepaid, addressed as 
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Robert L. Jeffs 
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PO BOX 888 
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Michael P. Zaccheo 
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APPENDIX A 
JOY L. CLEGG (A4138) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
William T. Hopkins 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone; (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRADLEY M. CLARK, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND MOTION TO PUBLISH THE 
Plaintiff, DEPOSITION OF BRADLEY M. CLARK 
vs. 
Civil No. 910400220 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, et 
al., Judge George E. Ballif 
Defendants. 
Defendant William T. Hopkins moves the Court for summary 
judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
because there are no issues of material fact remaining for 
decision and this defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of a law. This Motion is supported by the accompanying 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Affidavit of William T. 
Hopkins. 
Jw30 lOttjjj'iE 
c
 \ 2 
This defendant further moves the Court to publish the 
deposition of the plaintiff Bradley M. Clark. 
DATED this (7/J day of January, 1992. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
JoymJ. Clegi, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
William T. Hopkins 
FILED 
Fourth JU',K;.--; r,is;.'ict Court of 
HfT], ~ ' CARM^sWlfi . Clerk 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
********** 
BRADLEY M. CLARK 
Plaintiff, Case Number: 910400220 
vs. RULING 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, GEORGE E. BALLIF, JUDGE 
et al 
Defendants• 
********** 
This matter came before the Court on defendant William T. 
Hopkins' motion for summary judgment, which was filed on January 
30, 1992. 
The Court, having reviewed the motion and being fully advised, 
now enters its: 
RULING, 
The Court denies defendant's motion pursuant to Rule 56, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, There are genuine issues of material 
fact remaining which pertain to this defendant's alleged negligence 
and to the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Therefore, 
defendant Hopkins is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Since the Court's ruling does not dispose of this matter on the 
merits, no oral argument will be held unless counsel can show good 
cause therefor within 10 days. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this / V day of March, 1992. 
1. 
JOHN M. CHIPMAN, USB NO. 628 
HAROLD L. PETERSEN, USB NO. 4644 
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY 
Attorneys for Defendant Marcus Gilbert 
136 South Main Street, Suite 910 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 364-3627 
FILED 1H 
» " DISTRICT COURT 
WE ^ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRADLEY M. CLARK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, WILLIAM H. 
KING, MARCUS GILBERT, GORDON 
V. HOLBROOK, DONALD S. 
COLOVICH, WILLIAM T. HOPKINS, 
DAREN G. WOOLSSTENHULME, 
JENNIFER MacARTHUR, RITA M. 
KENNEDY and/or U.S. FOREST 
SERVICE, DAVID ADAMSON, and 
JOHN DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO PUBLISH 
DEPOSITIONS 
Civil No. 910400220 
JUDGE LYNN DAVIS 
Defendant Marcus Gilbert, through counsel, moves the 
Court to publish the depositions of Marcus Gilbert, Greg DuVal, 
and David Stephens, Copies of cited portions of those 
depositions are attached herewith. 
DATED this 11 day of April, 1993. 
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY 
fendant Gilbert 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this I ' day of April, 
1993, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO PUBLISH 
DEPOSITIONS was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
James G. Clark 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
96 East 100 South 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Robert L. Jeffs 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
Attorneys for Defendants Jennifer MacArthur 
and Farmers Insurance Exchange 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Richard K. Spratley 
RICHARD K. SPRATLEY & ASSOC. 
Attorneys for Defendant Donald S. Colovich 
1018-B Atherton Plaza, Suite B202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Michael P. Zaccheo 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendant Daren G. Woolstenhulme 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Paul M. Belnap 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company 
9 Exchange Place #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
APPENDIX B 
JAMES G. CLARK, USB, #3637 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
96 East 100 South 
Provo, UT 84606-4603 
Telephone: (801) 37 5-6092 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRADLEY M. CLARK, AFFIDAVIT OF GREG DUVAL 
Plaintiff, 
Civil No. 910400220 
vs. 
Judge: Lvnn W. Davis 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, et 
al 
Defendant. 
/ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Greg DuVal being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. That I am an accident reconstructionist hired by 
Plaintiff in the above entitled action. 
2. That my qualifications were previously set out in an 
affidavit in opposition to Defendant MacArthur's motion for summary 
judgment herein and the same is incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
3. That I have qualified as an expert witness in eve£y 
division of the Fourth Judicial District Court. 
4. That I interviewed Rita Kennedy, and her information was 
helpful. She did not provide temporal and spacial measurements 
which she is capable of providing enabling us to determine with 
relative certainty the exact mechanism of Brad Clark's injury. 
5. We have always maintained that it is impossible with the 
information available to determine the exact mechanism of 
Plaintiff's injuries. The best we can do is to come up with 
probabilities. I feel the most probable mechanism of the injuries 
was the sequence of crashes caused by the Woolstenhulme truck. 
6. The second most likely probability consists of the crash 
sequence caused by the Colovich automobile. 
7. I can provide with virtual certainty that one or the 
other of these events directly caused the collision with Plaintiff. 
8. All Defendants remaining in this case contributed in some 
way to the crash events. 
9. That the factual basis upon which I make these 
determinations are contained in my deposition and prior Affidavits 
and attachments filed in this case, and r incorporate them herein 
by this reference. 
10. I do not think it was unreasonable for Plaintiff to have 
exited the MacArthur vehicle. Plaintiff testified that Gilbert was 
in trouble and asking for help. The occupants of Plaintifffs car 
were injured, by a collision with Woolstenhulme, while in the car. 
The MacArthur car was not a place of relative safety. 
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Wherefore further affiant saith naught. 
DATED AND SIGNED this >' 2~ day of April, 1993 
• TDvitu 
1993. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /^ day of April, 
NOTARY M B £ > I C ~ 
Residing at: fo(jW
 t OjC 
My commission Expires: 
rsr-T^ Y pimuc 
f$'&^'ffi\ ohcrlynn White Fonatfrmaksr 
( s C j ^ l ' l 9 6 f ^> { lOOSouih 
\&Ti'tft./// Prove, Utah tv.fiOG 
<:AZ.»'r My Commission Expires 
Ff/O'uay 4th, 1995 . 
STAT?: OF UTAH 
clarbr39.doc 
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APPENDIX C 
DUVAL INVESTIGATIONS 
AND ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTION 
Ju ly 24, 1990 
James Clark 
Attorney at Lav 
96 East 100 South 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Re: Bradley Clark 
Dear Mr. Clark: 
At your request, I have begun to reconstruct an accident 
that occurred on December 10, 1989 on 1-15 near Farmington, Utah. 
Bradley Clark was a passenger in a vehicle that was driven by 
Jennifer McArthur. 
The accident was investigated by the Utah Highway Patrol. 
Their case number is 03-89-2512. 
I have contacted most parties that were involved in the 
accident. The following is a summary of their statements as to 
how the accident occurred. 
Rita Kennedy 
Mrs. Kennedy stated that she was south bound on SR-89. She 
had been driving from Ogden to Farmington. The roads had patches 
of ice on it. As she neared the accident area, she observed an 
orange colored Datsun stopped in the middle of the two south 
bound lanes. A person was standing outside the car waiving his 
hands. 
Rita swerved to the left to avoid the Datsun. As she did 
so, she lost control of the vehicle that she was driving. She 
continued to the left and her vehicle struck the guardrail 
several times. Her vehicle came to rest in the roadway. 
Rita exited her vehicle and saw oncoming vehicles. One of 
these vehicles was a semi tractor/trailer. She feared that her 
vehicle would be struck by these vehicles. She jumped over the 
guardrail to the east. She did not see any collision events 
after jumping over the guardrail. 
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Rita had been over the guardrail for a few seconds when Brad 
Clark came "flying" over the guardrail landing nearby. 
Approximately 10-15 seconds later, two men came over the 
guardrail to help Brad. 
Brad was injured. He had a hand, knee and head injury. He 
was disoriented and did not know what happened. 
When Rita climbed back over the guardrail, she saw that her 
vehicle had been struck by a Chevrolet truck. 
Brad Clark 
Brad stated he was a passenger in the vehicle driven by 
Jennifer McArthur. The vehicle was traveling in the inside south 
bound lane on SR-89. There was a semi tractor/trailer 
combination to their right and slightly ahead. The semi swerved 
to the left cutting off the McArthur vehicle. Jennifer applied 
the brakes. Her vehicle began to fishtail. The vehicle hit the 
guardrail hard. Brad remembers a male coming over to their 
vehicle. This person apologized for his vehicle "stalling" in 
the road. 
Brad could not remember exiting the McArthur vehicle. He 
thought he could remember another vehicle next to the guardrail. 
Daren Woolstenhulme 
Daren was driving south bound on SR-89. He stopped at a 
traffic light which he stated was by a Smith's Food King. There 
were other cars stopped at the light. He recalls a maroon Jeep 
Cherokee stopped nearby. 
When the traffic light turned green, the cars proceed south. 
As he neared the accident area he observed the Datsun stopped in 
the road. People were standing outside the Datsun. There was a 
white station wagon (Kennedy's vehicle) near the guardrail in the 
inside lane. 
He observed a semi in the outside lane swerve to its left 
into the inside lane. The semi cut off what Daren describes as a 
red "K" car. His description of the events that he observed 
identified this "K" car as the McArthur vehicle. 
The McArthur vehicle fish tailed and rotated 180 degrees so 
that it was sliding backwards. The McArthur vehicle then struck 
the guardrail. 
Daren observed one of the males standing near the Datsun to 
be out in the middle of the road. Daren braked his truck. While 
skidding, Daren struck the person near the Datsun. Daren later 
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talked with this person. Daren stated that the person that he 
hit had minor leg injuries and met with the other participants in 
the accident when the police report was made. The person that 
Daren struck would be Marcus Gilbert. 
Daren struck a white station wagon (Kennedy's vehicle) and 
rotated so that he was nearly broadside in the road. 
Daren observed the Jeep Cherokee hit the McArthur vehicle in 
a head-on fashion. Daren thought that the Jeep was struck by a 
large Buick before striking the McArthur vehicle. 
Daren was then struck in the drivers side by a Chevrolet 
Sprint driven by Gordon Holbrook. This impact pushed Daren's 
truck further south so that it struck the station wagon again. 
This impact was with the passenger side of Daren's truck into the 
back of the station wagon. 
Daren crawled out of the back window and went to the 
McArthur vehicle where he asked the girls if they were alright. 
He observed that the back window of the McArthur vehicle was 
broken out. 
Daren then accompanied Mr. Hopkins from the Jeep over the 
guardrail where they assisted Rita Kennedy and Brad Clark. 
Daren stated that the collision events happened in a very 
short time period. 
David Adamson 
David was traveling south bound behind the Jeep driven by 
Mr. Hopkins. David observed the Jeep begin to skid. David 
applied his brakes and "clipped" the back of the Jeep. David 
stated that he hit the right rear of the Jeep with the left front 
of his vehicle. David spun sideways and slid past the cars that 
had crashed in front of him. The Buick then collided with the 
right rear of David's vehicle. 
Don Colovich 
Don did not see the events involving the Kennedy vehicle, 
the semi, or the McArthur vehicle. Don stated that he collided 
with the back of the Jeep and thought that he hit the 
Woolstenhulme truck. 
Don initially appeared to know a lot about the accident but 
after conversing with him for a minute, I found that most of his 
knowledge appeared to be hearsay. 
Gordon Holbrook 
Gordon neared the accident scene and observed the 
Woolstenhulme truck in a vertical position in the road. Gordon 
applied the brakes and skidded into the drivers side of the 
Woolstenhulme truck. Gordon did not have any further knowledge 
of how the accident occurred. 
William King 
William stated that all of the events occurred in front of 
him. He could not provide any information about the other 
collisions. All the lanes were blocked in front of William. 
William collided with the Datsun. 
I have included a copy of the letter to William Hopkins. He 
may be able to provide additional information that could be of 
help. 
I feel that there are several key players in this accident. 
They are: 
Marcus Gilbert 
Rita Kennedy 
The unknown semi driver 
Jennifer McArthur and her passenger Heather Reeves 
Daren Woolstenhulme 
William Hopkins 
David Adamson 
Don Colovich 
Gordon Holbrook 
The above mentioned parties could have some liability or 
substantial information that would aid this case. Their 
statements may help determine when and how Brad was injured. I 
recommend that these parties be deposed. The above mentioned 
parties would be able to place the events on a diagram to the 
best of their recollection. If their respective insurance 
companies have pictures of their vehicles, it would be helpful to 
obtain them. 
I will make a scale diagram of the area and take photographs 
of the area for future use. 
I will contact Ellis Ferrell to find out where the McArthur 
vehicle is so I can inspect it and take pictures of the damage to 
the vehicle. 
LI'O 
J>»"» 
JOY L. CLEGG (A4138) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
William T. Hopkins 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRADLEY M. CLARK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, et 
al. , 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM T. 
HOPKINS 
Civil No. 910400220 
Judge George E. Ballif 
: ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
WILLIAM T. HOPKINS, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
states under oath as follows: 
1. Just before the accident in question, I was traveling 
in the right lane, South on U.S. 89, approaching the intersect 
ramp leading from U.S. 89 to 1-15 South, As I came over the top 
of the overpass I noticed a vehicle stalled in the right lane. 
The stalled car was not moving and was crosswise in the lane. I 
moved over into the left lane to avoid the car. I then noticed a 
r n >y 
two car accident in the left lane, along the guard rail. The two 
car accident was some distance beyond the stalled car, 
2. At this point, I observed the pick-up truck I was 
following apply his brakes and begin to slide, lose control and 
collide with another vehicle, I applied my brakes very 
cautiously due to the black ice and came to a complete stop in 
the left lane. I was stopped less than a minute when I was then 
struck from behind by another car. That impact did not move my 
car. Within sixty seconds I was again rear ended, but by a 
different vehicle. That impact pushed my vehicle approximately 
35 to 50 feet forward. 
DATED this ^/ day of January, 1992. 
bJJ&^-Tz^ ^522 
William T. Hopkins 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3 / day of January, 
1992. 
NOTARY PUBLIC [) _ 
Residing in the St-ate of Utah 
NOTAftV PUBUC 
My Commission E x p i r e s : I /@%~£$^ o*ii§*JoaoEN$eN 
$4106 
A ' 
u 
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APPENDIX D 
JAMES G. CLARK, USB #3637 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
96 East 100 South 
Provo, UT 84606-4603 
Telephone: (801) 375-6092 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRADLEY M. CLARK, AFFIDAVIT OF GREG DUVAL IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT 
Plaintiff, HOPKINS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND/OR IN THE 
VS. ALTERNATIVE IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, et. CONTINUANCE 
al. 
Defendants. Civil No. 910400220 
Judge: George E. Ballif 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
Lt. Greg DuVal, being first duly sworn upon his oath deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. That I was retained by counsel for the Plaintiff as an 
expert witness and as a forensic expert regarding the issues of 
accident investigation and reconstruction in the multiple vehicle 
automobile crash at issue in this action. 
2. That I am presently employed as a lieutenant with the 
Provo City Police Department in Provo, Utah. 
3. That since 1985 I have been President of my own company, 
DuVal Investigations and Accident Reconstruction, a private 
consulting business. 
4. That I hold a B.S. Degree in Police Science, Law 
Enforcement and Justice Administration from Brigham Young 
University, receiving said degree in 1979, 
5. That I have received post-graduate education specifically 
associated with accident reconstruction from Utah State Police 
Officer's Standard and Training, Northwestern University Traffic 
Institute. I have engaged in extensive self study, and I am a 
member in good standing of the Society of Accident 
Reconstructionistsf s (SOAR). 
6. That in the course of my police work and my private 
consulting business I have investigated thousands of automobile 
accidents and recostructed hundreds of automobile accidents. 
7. That I have qualified as an expert accident 
reconstructionist on numerous occasions in District and Circuit 
Courts for the State of Utah. 
8. I have certified and testified as an expert witness 
before every division in the Fourth District Court. 
9. That as an expert in the areas of accident investigation 
and reconstruction, I usually and ordinarily rely upon physical 
evidence obtained at the scene of the accident, photographs of 
damages to the vehicles, statements obtained from the witnesses, 
personal interviews, a review of affidavits, interrogatories, 
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requests for production and depositions in cases. 
10. In this case I have done all of the above. I have 
visited the scene of the incident and I have taken photographs. I 
have obtained photographs from the Utah Highway Patrol taken before 
any cars were moved from the scene. I have obtained and reviewed 
the police investigative report and witnesses statements contained 
therewith. I have seen witness statements obtained by insurance 
adjusters, reviewed the depositions taken in this case and I have 
personally conducted interviews with Rita Kennedy, Brad Clark, 
Daren Woolstenhulme, David Adamson, Don Colovich, and Gordon 
Holbrook. All interviews were with parties to this case and are 
foundational and constitute admissions by parties. 
11. Based upon my review of all the above materials in this 
case, and particularly the investigative officer's report and 
interviews with Adamson and Colovich, it is my opinion at this time 
that the Hopkins vehicle never came to a stop prior to colliding 
with the MacArthur vehicle in a head-on fashion. 
12. Based upon the statements of Adamson, Colovich, Hopkins, 
the investigating police officer and particularly the photographs 
taken by the Utah Highway Patrol before any of the vehicles had 
been moved, Defendant Hopkins vehicle crashed in to MacArthur's 
vehicle in a head-on fashion. 
13. Based upon the information I have available at this time, 
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it is my opinion that the incident did not happen as provided in 
Hopkins1 affidavit. That is inconsistent with the physical 
evidence in this case and with the statements which have been 
provided. 
14. The evidence provided by Hopkins and the Utah Highway 
Patrol photographs indicate that Hopkins made contact with at least 
three cars including MacArthur. 
15. Based upon my investigation and review of all materials 
in this case, it is my opinion that Defendant Hopkins was one of 
the prime players in this accident. There is insufficient evidence 
at this time to rule out liability on Hopkins, and in fact there 
appears to be some liability on him. 
16. It is my opinion that there are limited number of ways in 
which Brad Clark could have been injured in this accident. One of 
the most likely possibilities, to be established through further 
discovery, is that Brad Clark was struck by the MacArthur vehicle 
after MacArthur was struck head-on by Hopkins. 
17. In my interview with Defendant Adamson he told me that 
he was following Hopkins on the roadway, Hopkins began to break and 
slide sideways and Defendant Adamson's vehicle made contact with 
Hopkins1 vehicle. As Adamson1s vehicle spun around he saw the 
Hopkins vehicle make head on contact with the MacArthur vehicle, 
18. It is my opinion that Hopkins1 attempt to stop in the 
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middle of the freeway on-ramp may have been negligent and caused 
the collision with MacArthur's car. 
19. Defendant Colovich told me in his interview that he 
collided with the back of the Hopkins' vehicle. While this is 
consistent with Hopkins' claim that he was struck twice from 
behind, it is inconsistent that the collision took place over an 
approximate two minute period as Hopkins claims. 
20. Further, Rita Kennedy related in her interview that she 
saw the semi and the MacArthur car approaching and jumped over the 
guard rail. Rita had been over the guard rail for a few seconds 
when Brad Clark came flying over the guard rail landing nearby. 
Approximately ten to fifteen seconds later two men came over the 
guard rail to help Brad. Daren Woolstenhulme said that was he and 
Mr. Hopkins (from the jeep). 
21. I have not been able to interview Mr. Hopkins, he has not 
provided a statement, photographs, or a deposition in this case. 
In the absence of obtaining information from Hopkins, 
Woolstenhulme, Colovich, and Gilbert, I am unable to exclude 
Defendant Hopkins either as a negligent party or as a cause of the 
injury suffered by Brad Clark in this case. 
For further affiant saith not. 
DATED AND SIGNED this /* day of February, 1992. 
Lt. Gre^-DuVal 
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